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Leadership position, particularly from his brother-in-law, Jang Song Taek. The latter provides interesting assessments of Kim Jong Un's background and possible challenges to his claim to the A discussion between former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and South Korean officials and scholars on the prospects for the post-Kim.Korea rhetoric as a sign of distress rather than a realistic threat " and They see the DPRK as an object of pity, and the heightened North The embassy stressed, however, "theĪpathy – even nonchalance – with which the ROK public has reacted to the DPRK's blasts. Report, Pyongyang was motivated to drive home its conviction that it, not Seoul, called the shots on the peninsula. Lee had begun turning away from the policy of engagement with North Korea followed by his predecessors ( Documents 12 and 13). The possible motivations and goals behind the "rapid deterioration" in inter-Korea relations since the election of conservative Lee Myung Bak as.Three additional documents from 2009-2010, originally made public by WikiLeaks, provide reports from the U.S. This led INR to conclude that "Kim Jong Il will have to make some leadership changes soon, to root out pockets of oppositionĪnd to put his own stamp on his regime." ( Documents 6, 7 and 8) The implications for North Korean policies of the death of Kim Il Sung and the prolonged consolidation of Kim Jong Il in power, a delay caused in.diplomats saw the issue as possibly tied to the leadership succession in Pyongyang, as Kim Jong Il was North Korea's "supreme commander"Īnd needed to be seen as directing any military negotiations.
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The North described the MAC as part of the "useless"Īrmistice. Pyongyang's withdrawal nearly 20 years ago from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC).Will attack." Another document provides a fascinating evaluation of how China might respond to the outbreak of war on the peninsula should the nuclearĬrisis escalate. We will not attack the South first, but if it is clear you are going to attack, then we Will not give you time to collect troops around Korea to attack us. Oneĭocument records a frank warning from North Korean military officials during a meeting at Panmunjon: "this will not be a situation like the Iraq war. The deepening crisis in 1994 over the North's nuclear weapons program, and confrontations over inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities.plans to station Patriot missiles in North Korea, deemed by Pyongyang to be an "unpardonable grave militaryĬhallenge." This step was viewed as typical: "to record its strong opposition without committing itself to any particular line of action while it sorts out North Korea's initial response to U.S.Intelligence summaries prepared for the secretary of state that seek to assess the factors and interests driving such developments as: The documents from 1994-95, which saw the first nuclear crisis with North Korea and the death of Kim Il Sung, include excerpts from the morning AdditionalĬables made public by WikiLeaks (Documents 12-14) take the story up to the Obama administration and provide assessments of Kim Jong Un himself. Obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, mostlyįrom the State Department, these records describe events during the 1990s (the Clinton presidency) with notable echoes in the current crisis. Ultimate objectives underlying Pyongyang's repeated threats against the U.S. Today's posting provides a window into prior efforts to penetrate beneath North Korea's shrill rhetoric to understand the logic, political dynamics and "We will not give you time to collect troops around Korea to attack us." Yet American analysts believed during these earlier episodes that Pyongyang’s tone was aimed less at stoking hostilities than advancing a combination of practical objectives – from pushing the international community to accept North Korea's position, to playing for time, to bolstering the leader's political position at home.
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with a possible preemptive strike if circumstances called for it: "This will not be a situation like the Iraq war," U.S. In 1994, for instance, North Korean military officers threatened the U.S. While the current Kim is acting even more stridently in some cases, the documents reveal a past pattern characterized by bellicose conduct. Ways markedly similar to the behavior of the new leader, the records show.
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During earlier crises, Kim Jong Un's father and grandfather postured and threatened the region in Washington, D.C., Ap– For decades, the erratic behavior of North Korea's enigmatic leaders has often masked a mix of symbolic and pragmatic motives, according to declassifiedĭocuments posted today by the National Security Archive.